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Introduction
The ongoing …nancial and credit crisis has pushed existing monetary policy practices to their limit and created considerable interest in the appropriate post-crisis operating framework for monetary policy, particularly as there has been an active parallel debate about the regulatory framework for commercial banking. What might ultimately be termed the …rst generation of micro-founded monetary policy models had little to say on new monetary policy frameworks, as the short term policy rate was su¢ cient to stabilise the economy. But during this crisis many types of extended open market operations have been used to try and a¤ect longer term interest rates and asset prices, as a substitute for the short term rate which was constrained at its lower zero bound. In this paper, we thus seek to address the question of post-crisis monetary policy by considering the role of balance sheet operations in a model in which commercial banks, lending and external …nance premia all impact on the optimal formulation of monetary policy.
The Goodfriend-McCallum (2007) model is a Calvo-Yun monopolistically competitive production economy with sticky prices where households respect their budget constraint in formulating consumption plans, but one in which households must hold bank deposits to e¤ect transactions. And so the loans technology for the banking sector takes centre stage in this model, 1 which meets the requirements of the private sector subject to monitoring and quality of collateral constraints. Households can work either in the goods producing sector or in the banking sector monitoring loan quality. But in order to consider the implications of reserves, in the version of the model developed by Chadha and Corrado (2012) , banks also have to make a choice on their asset mix between reserves with the central bank or as loans with the private sector. The central bank in this model holds commercial bank reserves and sets the interest rate paid on those reserves. In this model the government budget constraint is modi…ed to include claims from reserves, as well as standard issuance of public debt to meet excess of expenditures over taxes. Reserves in this model are outside money and respond to the demand for liquidity from …nancial institutions.
A banking sector based model can both amplify and add persistence to a standard macroeconomic set-up. This is because decision rules for output are shown to incorporate the equilibrium level of commercial bank assets and the price (or spread) at which those assets are provided. The recent boom and bust in advanced country debtor economies would seem to con…rm the continuing relevance of this insight. First, we consider the non-standard monetary, or balance sheet, policies carried out by the Federal Reserve in response to the …nancial crisis and examine how they can be modelled. Speci…cally, we model the injection of bank reserves in our model economy in three ways, either as perfectly elastic supply of bank reserves meeting commercial bank demand or as a swap for bonds or capital. Furthermore we consider the role of a policy rule for the supply of reserves to supplement or replace existing interest rate rules. These one-o¤ responses are shown to be able to stabilise the economy following a negative 1 See Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and Chadha, Corrado and Holly (2008) for an outline of this modelling device and its implications. downward shock to asset prices.
The motivation for providing reserves is to meet the liquidity preference for commercial banks. Gale (2011) shows that under risk aversion the market cannot supply su¢ cient liquidity to the …nancial system. This is because there is an incentive for savers to swap illiquid assets for liquid assets and this will leave the market as a whole short of liquid assets and long illiquid assets. This problem will tend to be exacerbated if there is a collapse in con…dence in the interbank market, when distributional shocks to banks no longer get re-cycled around the system. The monetary authorities can o¤set this liquidity shortage by issuing short-term liabilities backed by …scal transfers i.e. interest bearing reserves or T-Bills. This operation reduces the holding of illiquid assets by the private sector and increases the reserve-deposit ratio of the banking sector. From a …scal or debt management perspective if we take the structure of debt as given, the swap of illiquid for liquid debt instruments hedges the private sector against liquidity risk and allows the …scal policy maker to collect liquidity premia as their return. The danger of this operation is that it is conducted at a time of …scal de…cits and so may be viewed as a change in the preferences of the monetary and …scal policy maker and thus leads to an expectation of lower interest rates and higher …scal de…cits (see Nordhaus, 1994) .
Under co-ordination of monetary and …scal policy, we can examine the case for the systematic use of balance sheet or reserve policies. Because compared to a model that does not explicitly model bank balance sheets, this model can deliver an endogenous dynamic response for various risk premia and for the supply of loans and deposits. Using standard methods, we can also compare the responses of our arti…cial economy with and without reserve injections. We derive the approximate welfare criterion of the representative household and …nd that the economy where commercial banks have an endogenous choice over reserve holdings (qua liquidity) performs better in welfare terms than when commercial banks do not have such an incentive. The holding of reserves over the business cycle acts as a substitute for more costly provision of commercial bank assets and thus reduces the volatility of interest spreads to shocks, and varying the availability of reserves over expansions and contractions, acts to help stabilize the impulse from the monetary sector. 2 The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the unconventional monetary policies carried out by the Federal Reserve, as an example, and uses a simple framework for understanding a stylized ‡ow of funds and the role of commercial banks in the monetary system. We also set-up the government's budget constraint in this section, showing that the payment of the policy rate on bank reserves will mean that there will be a direct impact on the equation of motion for government debt.
Section 3 outlines the implications of the loans production function approach for key macroeconomic decision rules and outlines the determination of key market interest rates. Section 4 considers the implications of commercial banks asset management in terms of reserve holdings to account for the relative returns from holding reserves or producing loans and liquidity concerns. Section 5 explains the standard calibration techniques used. Section 6 outlines the results of the impulse response analysis of various balance sheet operations and Section 7 undertakes welfare analysis of some key results. Section 2 Paying interest on reserves is thus a way to meet the Friedmanite maximum without having a de ‡ation. on a number of unconventional policy initiatives to try and provide a monetary stimulus to the U.S economy and re-awaken frozen credit markets. Many of these measures were concerned directly with the Fed's balance sheet, reserves and asset holdings. These policies at the ZLB are e¤ectively …scal policies, as they involve the issuance of short term …scal instruments and so we wish to integrate these monetary-…scal instruments into our model.
Paying Interest on Reserves
An initial, yet important, policy development was the payment of interest on reserves held by commercial banks with the central bank. The Federal Reserve had applied to Congress for the authority to pay interest on bank reserves on various occasions (Meyer,2001; Kohn, 2004) and was granted permission in 2006 under the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act. Originally, the policy was not due to become e¤ective until 2011 as Congress had worries about its …scal costs, 3 but as the economic conditions in the U.S worsened its implementation was brought forward to 2008. There is strong theoretical backing for such a policy. Hall (2002) outlines a model by which the payment of interest on reserves can become a policy tool capable of controlling the price level in a world without money, whilst Chadha and Corrado (2012) show that paying interest on reserves equal to the policy rate can provide an incentive for …nancial intermediaries to vary their holdings of reserves cyclically which in turn attenuates ‡uctuations in the external …nance premium and helps stabilise a monetary economy. The issuance of such reserves are very close substitutes to short-term T-bills and because interest is payable, they are in e¤ect a swap of liquid assets for illiquid assets. Kashyap and Stein (2012) show that if interest is paid on reserves the monetary authority has two tools, the quantity and price of reserves, by which they can implement policy and thus can pursue two 3 Estimates of the cost of paying interest made by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce suggest the cost in the …rst year would be $253 million, rising to $308 million by the …fth year, with a total over 5 years of $1.4 billion over …ve years. This is based on the assumption that the federal funds rate would average 4. objectives; both price stability and more macroprudential regulation.
Large Scale Asset Purchases
Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) can be thought of as traditional open market operations, in which the central bank changes the monetary base by buying and selling assets in exchange for reserves, but on a much larger scale and over a longer duration. Traditionally the central bank would use OMOs to meet the demand for reserves at its target interest rate, requiring relatively small, short-lived ‡uctuations in the level of reserves. In November 2008 the Fed announced it would begin purchasing housing agency debt and mortgage-backed agency securities to the value of $600bn in response to the housing crisis and in order to promote the health of mortgage lending. In March 2009 this was increased to $1.25 trillion. These purchases were largely of maturities between 3 months and 5 years. As they have reached maturity, the principal has been reinvested to fund the purchase of Treasury securities and maintain the value of the agency debt and agency backed securities section of the LSAP.
Accompanying this extension was the announcement that the Fed would begin to buy $300bn of Treasury securities, over 60% of which were of between 3 and 10 year maturities. The purchase of Treasuries was designed to support falling asset prices by acting as a large buyer and through the portfolio balance channel this should spread to other assets in the economy. It was also a direct injection of liquid reserves into the economy aimed at improving con…dence and conditions in impaired credit markets. These large scale asset purchases were predominantly funded by the creation of over a trillion dollars of new reserves, making them the largest quantitative easing programme enacted since the crisis. In November 2010, in light of a continuing weakness in economic forecasts, the purchase of longer-term Treasuries was extended further by $600bn under a second round of quantitative easing (QE2) which took the total LSAP to over $2 trillion. In September 2011, the FOMC announced a maturity extension programme under which it will buy an additional $400bn of longer-dated treasuries but simultaneous sterilise these by selling short-term Treasuries to the same value. The goal is to lower longer-term yields without increasing the size of the central bank's balance sheet by "twisting" the yield curve and increasing the average maturity of the Fed's Treasuries portfolio by 25 months. More may follow.
Credit Versus Quantitative Easing
The term quantitative easing …rst arrived in the lexicon to describe the Bank of Japan's policy of In a pure QE regime, the focus of policy is the quantity of bank reserves, which are liabilities of the central bank; the composition of loans and securities on the asset side of the central bank's balance sheet is incidental.... In contrast, the Federal Reserve's credit easing approach focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how this composition of assets a¤ects credit conditions for households and businesses.
In theory QE is a policy which seeks to change the size of the central bank's balance sheet, increasing liabilities through the creation of new reserves, or other liquid …scal liabilities. Often these reserves are then used to purchases assets from the …nancial or private sector. Credit easing (CE) di¤ers in that it targets the asset side of the balance sheet, speci…cally the compositional mix of assets held by the liabilities, now make up almost two-thirds, increasing by just over $1.5tn. 4 In November 2009 the Fed began reinvesting the returns it made on agency debt and other short term assets it had bought to part-fund its further purchases of longer term Treasury securities.
The Balance Sheet of Unconventional Policies
We introduce a simple framework for analyzing the e¤ect of unconventional policies on the monetary balance sheet. For simplicity, since we abstract from other forms of central bank money and concentrate on bank reserves alone in our model, high powered money is identical to reserves. More traditionally the central bank controls the stock of …at money (outside money) and …nancial intermediaries create other forms of money, which are claims on the private sector. As …nancial intermediation allows alternative assets to serve as money, it o¤ers a close substitute to (outside) …at money and the ability of the central bank to determine the overall nominal level of expenditure depends on the relationship between outside and inside money. The central bank has a powerful tool to regulate …nancial intermediaries and to a¤ect the quantity of money in circulation: reserves, which may be either or both of fractional and or voluntary. 5 
Private Sector
Assets Liabilities 7 The net assets of commercial banks and of the central bank are both zero. The private sector has net assets given by
i t i and so because r = (1 )B + k K and P 1 i=0 i t i = B, we can note that the net private sector assets are also zero. 5 See Freeman and Haslag (1996) and Sargent and Wallace (1985) . 6 In this example we assume that the private sector is represented by households. 7 If we operate in an open economy, central bank assets would also include foreign exchange reserves r f .
We can see from this ‡ow of funds the mechanism by which unconventional policies occur. The central bank can perform quantitative easing by increasing the size of its balance sheet. It does this by extending an increased level of reserves to commercial banks which must be backed by an increased holding of either bonds or capital, which in turn must be bought from the private sector. Alternatively, credit easing is conducted through the composition of the balance sheet. With their liabilities unchanged, the central bank can buy capital from the private sector, increasing its own holdings. It funds these purchases by selling bonds back to the private sector, leaving the net e¤ect on the size of both the central bank and private sector's assets at zero. Due to the di¤ering properties of bonds and capital as collateral in our model's loan production function, this exchange has implications for levels of deposit demand which we will discuss later.
Reserves and the …scal position
How might paying interest on reserves change the …scal position? Because, ultimately paying interest rates on reserves will rely on public sector's budget constraint. The per period government budget constraint means that any excess of government expenditure, G t , over tax receipts, T t , and payment of interest on debt, R B t+1 B t+1 , and/or reserves, R IB t r t , will be …nanced by the issuance of bonds or central bank money given the consumption good price index, P A t . Note that the interest paid to the private sector is R B and to commercial banks is R IB , which is the policy rate in our model. Hence if we look at the consolidated budget identity for the government sector we note that: 8
so the government can …nance its net expenditure by issuing government debt, B, or by issuing reserves, r t . However if interest rates are paid on reserves they will become interest bearing and therefore comparable to government debt. Clearly any excess government expenditure can be …nanced by issuing bonds to the private sector or by supplying reserves to commercial banks at a di¤erentiated interest.
We leave the determination of the relative interest rates to section 3.1. As we assume a stationary level of debt in this model there are not implications for …scal solvency in this set-up as all deviations from steady state debt to GDP are strictly temporary. In e¤ect, we are conditioning the issuance of reserves on a given path of public debt, which we simply assume to be optimal save for liquidity considerations.
The General Equilibrium Monetary Model
As pointed out by Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) money aggregates should be reconnected to general equilibrium models as they a¤ect consumption decisions of liquidity constrained households and the 8 In this setting the government sector includes both the government and the Bank of England. We also assume that high powered money comprises only reserves not coins.
spreads across several …nancial instruments and assets. Similarly open market operations, or balance sheet policies, will a¤ect loans and therefore consumption. A simple way to incorporate money and spreads into a general equilibrium setting is to study the banking sector proposed by Goodfriend and McCallum ( 
Households and the Production Sector
Households are liquidity constrained and decide the amount of consumption and the amount of labour they wish to supply to the production sector and to the banking sector according to the following utility function:
where c t denotes real consumption, n s t is supply of labour in goods sector, m s t is the supply of monitoring work in the banking sector and denotes the weight of consumption in the utility function. They are subject to the budget constraint:
where q t is the price of capital, K t is the quantity of capital, P t is the price of household's produced good, P A t is the consumption good price index, n t is the labour demanded by household as producer, m t ; is the labour demanded by household's banking operation, w t is the real wage, D t is the nominal holding of broad money, tax t is the real lump-sum tax payment, R B t is the nominal interest rate on government bonds purchased in t + 1; B t+1 . We also assume that any pro…t from the banking sector, t , goes to the households'sector. The Lagrange multiplier of this constraint is denoted as t and is the elasticity of household demand. Household choose the level of monitoring work, m t , and the level of employment work, n t , they wish to o¤er to the production and the banking sector.
At the same time households'consumption, given the cash-in-advance constraint, is a¤ected by the amount of loanable funds they can obtain:
where v t denotes velocity and D t are deposits.
The production sector, characterized by monopolistic competition and Calvo pricing, adopts a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with capital, K t , and labour, n t , subject to productivity shocks. Firms decide the amount of production they wish to supply and the demand for labour by equalizing sales to net production:
where denotes the capital share in the …rm production function, A1 t is a productivity shock in the goods production sector whose mean increases over time at a rate % and denotes the elasticity of aggregate demand, c A t . The Lagrange multiplier of this constraint is denoted as, t : By clearing the household and production sectors, 9 we can de…ne the equilibrium in the labour market and in the goods market. Speci…cally, the demand for monitoring work:
depends negatively on wages, w t , and positively on consumption, c t , and where 1 is the share of monitoring in the loan production function. These two sectors also provide the standard relationship for the riskless interest rate and the bond rate.
Banking Sector
We now turn to the analysis of how the banking sector a¤ects the economy. The production function for the quantity of loans is given by:
where A2 t denotes a shock to monitoring work, A3 t is a shock on capital as collateral and
). The parameter k denotes the inferiority of capital as collateral in the banking production function, while is the share of collateral in the loan production function. Increasing monitoring e¤ort is achieved by increasing the number of people employed in the banking sector and therefore reducing the employment in the goods production sector.
While in standard Calvo-Yun models nominal consumption plans pin down the demand for money, in this model with banking, money is produced by banks, so any shift in the supply of loanable funds generated by shocks to monitoring e¤ort or collateral also a¤ect consumption. Speci…cally the banking sector matches deposit demand from liquidity constrained consumers with a technology to produce 9 For details on the model set-up, derivation and notation see the technical appendix, available on request.
loans by substituting monitoring work for collateral in supplying loans. Also, we assume that loans are a¤ected by the reserve/deposit ratio, rr t :
Note that while Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) assume a fractional reserve requirement where the reserve-deposit ratio is given, we analyse the implications of varying reserve holdings and outline this mechanism in Section 4. Loan demand comes through the cash in advance constraint as consumption requires deposits and this must be …nanced above the level of reserves, by loans (8) . Loan demand and supply come together with a simple substitution of the bank's loan production function in to (8) and the resultant equation in to the household's cash in advance constraint (4) leading to:
In this way …nancial shocks have real e¤ects.
The di¤erentiation of (9) with respect to K t+1 gives an expression t A3 t kq t which is a function of the marginal value of collateralized lending:
which depends on consumption, c t , and on the value of the collateral, q t and b t : This expression also enters in the asset price equation:
Finally the Central Bank sets the policy rate which a¤ects the incentives of banks to hold reserves.
Consumption, monitoring work and asset prices
We now describe in more detail the main log-linear relationships which characterize the model. In our notation variables without time subscript denote steady-state values whereas those with a time subscript denote log-deviation from steady-state. A log-linear formulation of (9) shows how loanable funds a¤ect the consumption of liquidity constrained consumers:
With the presence of a cash in advance constraint, a shock to velocity, v t ; will increase consumption.
Consumption, c t , is also positively a¤ected by the amount of monitoring work, m t ; where is the share of collateral in the loans production function and (1 ) represents the share of monitoring costs. It is also a¤ected by the amount of collateral represented by bonds, b t , and capital whose value is given by q t . A positive shock to monitoring, a2 t ; by increasing the e¢ ciency with which banks produce loans, increases the supply of loans and therefore consumption. Similarly a negative shock to collateral, a3 t ;
by reducing the price of capital, q t ; will negatively a¤ect consumption. The parameters c, b and k 1 represent the steady-state fraction of consumption in output, the holding of bonds and a composite parameter re ‡ecting the inferiority of capital compared to bonds as liquidity. 10 The demand for monitoring work, which derives from (6), is given by:
A higher wage, w t ; will reduce the resources devoted to monitoring. Similarly monitoring will be a¤ected by the marginal utility of consumption and the marginal value of households'funds, t : The steady state parameters, m, w, and represent the steady-state proportions of employment in the banking sector, the level of the real wage, and the ratio of the weight of consumption in the utility function relative to the steady-state shadow value of consumption. A key term here is the marginal value of collateralized lending, t ; from (10), which increases as consumption rises and falls as collateral becomes more widely available:
t depends on the value of the collateral, q t and b t , on a collateral shock, a3 t ; and on consumption, c t . Higher levels of consumption increase the marginal value of capital and hence the collateral value, q t :
The increase in collateral value leads to more borrowing and more consumption. The parameter k 2 is again a composite coe¢ cient similar to k 1 : 11
The marginal value of collateralized lending also feeds back into the capital asset price equation, q t , derived from (11):
In (15) the marginal value of collateralized lending, t ; potentially can amplify asset price volatility and magnify the response of the economy to both real and …nancial shocks. Both real, a1; and …nancial shocks, a3; directly feed back into asset prices alongside the expected marginal productivity of capital
where mc t+1 denotes marginal cost in period t + 1, is the share of capital in the goods production function and n is employment in the goods production sector. Similarly expected asset prices, E t q t+1 ; the change in the shadow value of households' funds (E t t+1 t ) alongside the wedge between the marginal utility of consumption and the shadow value of funds also
is a function of the ratio of consumption to output, c, of the parameter re ‡ecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; of steady-state capital, K; and of the trend growth rate, . 1 1 The parameter k2 =
is a function of k1, of steady-state capital, K; and of the steady-state ratio of consumption, c:
a¤ect the value of capital, q t . The parameter 1 is a composite function of the depreciation rate of capital while the parameter 1 is a composite function of steady-state marginal costs, of steady-state employment in the goods sector and of the capital share in the production of goods. 12 
Market Interest Rates
The decision of the banking sector is articulated in two stages. In the …rst one interest rates are determined and then, given the constellation of spreads, banks decide the optimal level of reserves and assets in order to maximize expected returns. The benchmark theoretical interest rate R T is simply a standard intertemporal nominal pricing kernel, priced o¤ real consumption and in ‡ation. Basically it boils down to a one-period Fisher equation:
The interbank rate or policy rate is set by a standard feedback rule responding to in ‡ation, t , and output, y t , with parameters, and y , respectively. Policy rates are smoothed by 1 > > 0.
To …nd the loan rate R L we must equate the marginal product of loans per unit of labour 
Therefore in log-linear form the interest rate on loans, R L t ; is greater than the policy rate by the extent of the external …nance premium.
The external …nance premium, EF P t ; is the real marginal cost of loan management, and it is increasing in velocity, v t ; real wages, w t ; monitoring work in the banking sector, m t ; and reserve requirements, rr t ; and decreasing in consumption, c t . The yield on government bonds is derived by maximizing households' utility with respect to bond holdings,
In its loglinear form it is the riskless rate, R T t ; minus the liquidity service on bonds, which can be interpreted as a liquidity premium (LP):
where (c t + t ) measures the household marginal utility relative to households shadow value of funds while t is the marginal value of the collateral. It is in fact these key margins -the real marginal cost 1 2 The
is a function of the discount factor, ; of the depreciation rate of capital, ; and of the trend growth rate, :
is function of steady-state employment in goods sector, n, of steady-state marginal costs, mc; of steady-state capital, K; and of the parameter re ‡ecting the capital share in the production function of the goods sector, . Details of the derivation are reported in the technical appendix, available on request.
of loan management versus the liquidity service yield -that determine the behavior of spreads. In the above expression, denotes the consumption weight in the utility function whereas t is the shadow value of consumption, c t . The interest rate on deposits is the policy rate, R IB t ; minus a term in the reserve deposit ratio:
These spreads will be e¤ected by the supply of reserves or liquidity in this model and so will impact on the resulting path of consumption.
Central Bank Reserves and Commercial Banks
Monetary policy operates through the manipulation of short-term interest rates as the policy instrument, which a¤ects the market clearing level of high powered money, or reserves. The previous section shows that this short term rate also impacts on other interest rates spreads via the external …nance premium and/or the liquidity premium by changing the path of aggregate private or public demand. In this section, we outline the approach of Chadha and Corrado (2012) for considering the implications of introducing an incentive for commercial banks to hold reserves to account for the relative returns from holding reserves or producing loans and to deal with liquidity concerns.
Commercial banks may decide to vary the mix of their assets and central banks, through balance sheet operations may allow them to do so. Unlike Curdia and Woodford (2011) where reserves are provided up to the banks' satiation point, in our framework banks optimise their reserve holdings subject to a pro…t maximising condition under a liquidity constraint.
We adopt a simple expression for the commercial bank's within period bank expected returns.
Given the constellation of interest rates as de…ned in the previous section, the bank's problem (see Baltensperger, 1980 ) is to maximize total returns within period subject to the returns from loans, L t , which are lent out at the collateralized interest rate of R L t , reserves held at the central bank, r t , which are assumed to pay the interbank (policy) interest rate, R IB t ; and the payment of deposit interest, R D t , to deposits:
Here commercial banks' pro…ts are subject to a side-constraint motivated by concerns about the management of liquid reserves. Note that reserves are returned at the end of the period but loans at the beginning of the next period. We assume that there is an exogenous target for the level of reserves, r, perhaps set by custom and practice or by legislation. 13 The costs of reserve management, C t , are then modelled in two parts: banks wish to smooth reserves and face a penalty rate of an uncollateralized external …nance premium, R T t , in deviations of reserves from target and are also subject to a liquidity preference term, t , which we can think of as an ex ante probability of a liquidity shortfall. The …rst term will imply that reserves are likely to be smoothed over time because banks may not wish to implement large-scale changes in their asset allocation from period to period, as these may signal mismanagement of previous asset allocations or run reputational risks. The cost of deviation from target is the penalty interest rate, which is symmetric in this set-up. This is because if r t < r, the commercial banks will fund its shortfall at the penalty rate, and if r t > r the commercial banks will not be paid interest on excess reserves and pays the opportunity cost of lending its assets out at R T t . The liquidity preference term represents shifts in the commercial banks'chosen level of reserves and re ‡ects an exogenous probability of a liquidity shortfall and so an increase in t corresponds to a fall in bank liquidity below the minimum required level r.
Note that by choosing the reserve level, the asset side of the commercial banks balance sheet , L t +r t , is now fully determined and so by construction are liabilities, that is deposits, D t . From the balance sheet of the banking sector, discussed in the previous section, L t = D t r t so we can substitute and write the Lagrangian as:
For which the …rst order conditions are:
The Lagrange multiplier is the shadow value of reserve management and is given by the ratio of pro…ts on reserves to the 'precautionary'motives for holding reserves:
If r t is set to one as to re ‡ect the equal relative importance of the two arguments, we can solve for the optimal level of bank reserves:r 1 3 In the Eurozone, for example, 2% of commercial bank reserves are lodged with central banks. In the UK, up to 2% of eligible reserves can be lodged with the Bank of England as interest bearing accounts. Basel III's liquidity coverage ratio will seek to increase the holdings of liquid assets.
Hence at the optimal pro…t rate the reserve ratio,r t , is determined by the interbank loan rate (the return on reserves) minus the returns on collateralized loans,R IB t R L t , scaled by the penalty uncollateralized loan rate,R T t ; if reserves are di¤erent from target, r; and a term re ‡ecting a preference for reserves or liquidity, t . With a su¢ ciently high preference for liquidity, t , then increasing quantities of reserves will be held. Another way to think about this expression is that the deviation of reserve requirements from steady-state is the ratio of the cost of a liquidity shortfall to the opportunity cost of holding further deposits. Now let us examine the reserves in terms of market interest rates. Given (18) we can re-write (21) as:r
which introduces the trade-o¤ between reserves being driven down (up) by higher (lower) external …nance premium, and the need to o¤set changes in the probability of a liquidity shortfall. We will return to the policy implications of this result in the conclusion. If there is a preference for liquidity over illiquidity, as necessitated by a …nancial intermediary that transforms maturity, which re ‡ects inter alia the liquidity preference term,^ t , the bank will be better o¤ if excess reserves can be supplied and this will be accomplished by swapping loans for reserves at some rate of transformation which re ‡ects the relative interest rates on the two activities. Now let us consider a simple thought experiment in which the rate of return on reserves increases and that on loans stays constant -the allocation towards reserves per unit of loans will increase and reserves relative to loans will rise and hence so will the reserve-deposit ratio. Similarly if the rate of return on reserves falls, the rate of allocation to reserves will fall and accordingly the reserve-deposit ratio will fall. For comparison, Figure 4 plots the ratio of the behaviour of reserves relative to loans for a …xed reserve-deposit ratio (black dotted) and for changes induced by changes in the return on reserves alone (red line). The basic mechanism is illustrated here but what we …nd in the model will result from the interaction of both loan rates, policy rates (which are paid on reserves) and the movement in the loans production function and so we turn to the calibrated model. Table 2 provides a complete list of the endogenous and exogenous variables of the model and their meaning while Table 3 reports the values for the parameters and Table 4 the steady-state values of relevant variables. 14 Following Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) we choose the consumption weight in utility, ; to yield 1/3 of available time in either goods or banking services production. We also set the relative share of capital and labour in goods production to be 0.36. We choose the elasticity of substitution of di¤erentiated goods, , to be equal to 11. The discount factor, ; is set to 0.99 which is close to the canonical quarterly value while the mark-up coe¢ cient in the Phillips curve, ; is set to 0.1. The depreciation rate, , is set to be equal to 0.025 while the trend growth rate, %; is set to 0.015 which corresponds to 6% per year. The steady-state value of bond holding level relative to GDP, b, is set to 0.56 as of the third quarter of 2005. The steady state of private sector bond holdings relative to GDP is set at 0.50, consistent with holdings of U.S. Treasury securities as of end of year 2006. 15 The parameters linked to money and banking are de…ned as follows. Velocity at its steady state level is set at 0.276 which is close to the ratio between US GDP and M3 at fourth quarter 2005, yielding 0.31.
Calibration
The fractional reserve requirement, rr ; is set at 0.1. This is consistant with the reserve ratio set by the Federal Reserve on all liabilities above the low reserve tranche and approximately equal to the average tier one capital ratio in the US since the mid 2000s. The fraction of collateral, ; in loan production is set to 0.65, the coe¢ cient re ‡ecting the inferiority of capital as collateral, k; is set to 0.2 while the production coe¢ cient of loan, F; is set to 9.14. The low value of capital productivity re ‡ects the facts that usually banks use higher fraction of monitoring services and rely less on capital as collateral.
With these parameters values we see that the steady state of labour input, n; is 0.31 which is close to 1/3 as required. The ratio of time working in the banking service sector, m m+n ; is 1.9% under the benchmark calibration, not far the 1.6% share of total US employment in depository credit intermediation as of August 2005. As the steady-states are computed at zero in ‡ation we can interpret all the rates as real rates. The riskless rate, R T ; is 6% per annum. The interbank rate, R IB ; is 0.84% per annum which is close to the 1% per year average short-term real rate. The government bond rate, R B ; is 2.1% per annum. Finally the collateralized external …nance premium is 2% per annum which is in line with the average spread of the prime rate over the federal funds rate in the US. 16 The model is solved using the solution methods of King and Watson (1998) who also provide routines to derive the impulse responses of the endogenous variables to di¤erent shocks, to obtain asymptotic variance and covariances of the variables and to simulate the data. 17 For the impulse response analysis and simulation exercise we consider the real and …nancial shocks described in Table 5 , which reports the volatility and persistence parameters chosen for the calibration and simulation exercise. These are standard parameters in the literature and simulate a fall in output consistent with the crisis. 1 4 The equations for the steady-state equations are listed in Section A.4 of the technical appendix, available on request. 1 5 The steady state of the transfer level, the Lagrangian of the production constraint and base money depend on the above parameters. The steady state of the marginal cost is mc = 1 . 1 6 The equations for the steady-states are listed in the Technical Appendix. 1 7 The log-linearized equations for the model are listed in section C of the Technical Appendix. King and Watson's MATLAB code is generalized in that for any model, we adapt three MATLAB …les. King and Watson's package includes standardized auxiliary programs impkw.m to generate the impulse responses to di¤erent shocks to the endogenous variables and the program fdfkw.m to obtain the …ltered autocovariances and the …ltered second moments from the model solution.
The program impkwsimu.m simulates the arti…cial series and allows to generate HP …ltered data.
Impulse Responses From Balance Sheet Policies
To understand the dynamics of this model, in this section we outline the impact of a negative shock to the value of collateral in the context of various adaptations of the original framework. Our …nancial sector shock operates through the asset price and can be thought of as a primitive representation of the shock which hit the U.S. housing market towards the end of 2007. This had a negative impact on the value of assets that households were able to post as collateral in exchange for loans in the form of housing. The securitisation of these mortgage loans, and their subsequent trade by …nancial intermediaries, meant that this also a¤ected the value of collateral banks themselves held, damaging their ability to raise funds.
We also analyse a case in which we negatively shock productivity in the manufacturing sector before brie ‡y discussing the response of the system to a change in the composition of assets held on the central bank's balance sheet to provide a simplistic insight into credit easing policies. Figures 5-9 plot the log-deviation from steady state responses of real consumption, in ‡ation, the external …nance premium, the liquidity premium, the policy rate, real deposits, real reserves, real loans, the reserve-deposit ratio, private sector bond holdings, the level of monitoring work employed, employment in the goods sector, asset prices, the bond rate and the loan rate.
The Role of Reserves
We …rst show the mechanism through which reserve decisions can a¤ect the real economy in our framework. Figure 5 shows the e¤ects of our negative collateral shock under a regime of a …xed reservedeposit ratio compared to one in which reserves are decided endogenously by pro…t maximising banks.
In the …rst instance, when the shock hits there is an initial fall in asset prices which reduces the e¢ ciency of producing loans as households have less collateral to post. As bonds are …xed, to produce the same amount of loans would require an increase in monitoring e¤ort on the part of the banks and thus loan production becomes more expensive. This causes the external …nance premium to increase and through the cash-in-advance constraint we see a fall in consumption and deposits which increases the EFP yet further. As the reserve/deposit ratio is …xed, the fall in deposits leads to an equally proportioned fall in loans and reserves. In response to the fall in output and in ‡ation the central bank cuts the policy rate and the economy returns to equilibrium.
Alternatively, by endogenising the reserve decision and allowing the reserve-deposit ratio to ‡uctuate, as the cost of providing loans increases banks demand more reserves and the central bank supplies them perfectly elastically. This allows banks to shed the now more costly loans, pushing up the reserve/deposit ratio. This means the EFP rises by less with monitoring e¤ort actually falling and a smaller contraction in consumption. The smaller fall in consumption is mirrored by a smaller fall in deposits and the policy rate now follows a much smoother path as reserve policy takes some of the burden of stabilising the economy. Thus we can see that reserves have a signi…cant role to play in our economy due to their …nancial attenuation e¤ects.
In the recent crisis policymakers were faced with having to respond to a contractionary shock whilst their default policy tool, the short-term nominal interest rate, was constrained by the zero lower bound.
To investigate this in the context of our model we de-activate the Taylor rule, holding the policy rate constant and subject the model to the same negative collateral shock. What we see in Figure 5 is that because the policy rate does not fall in response to the downturn in consumption and in ‡ation, the return from holding reserves is even higher, increasing the level of demand from …nancial intermediaries.
This creates an even larger response in reserves than we saw under an active interest rate policy which attenuates the rise in the external …nance premium to such an extent that it temporarily falls before returning to equilibrium. The strength of this attenuation is enough to bring consumption and in ‡ation back to equilibrium along more or less the same path as when interest rate policy was unconstrained. This suggests that altering the level of reserves on commercial banks'balance sheets can stabilise the economy, even in the absence of interest rate policy. In order to realistically model OMOs we must augment the original endogenous reserves framework to take account of this swap of reserves for assets. Reserves, which are the central bank's only liability, must be backed by an equally valued holding of asset holdings. Initially we assume the central bank holds only government bonds, the total supply of which is …xed unless exogenously shocked. This means that in order to increase the level of reserves the central bank must buy bonds from the private sector, increasing the fraction of total bonds it holds and decreasing the amount held by the private sector.
Open Market Operations
To model this we de…ne total bond holdings as the sum of private sector and central bank bond
and as central bank bond holdings must equal reserves, we can substitute and re-arrange to give the log linear relationship
which we add to our system of equations. It is this newly de…ned variable b p which determines the amount of collateral households have available so we substitute it for b in the loan supply and marginal value of collateralised lending equations 18 .
An alternative is to swap the other type of asset in our economy, capital. This is less liquid and less e¢ cient as collateral, but could equally be bought by the central bank in exchange for new reserves in the same way that bonds are. To do this we introduce an equation de…ning total capital holdings as a function of an exogenous shock in the same way we did for bond holdings. The central bank can now hold two assets on its balance sheet, so we hold the level of bonds …xed as before and set the steady state value of capital held by the central bank at zero. By de…ning private sector capital holdings in a log linear form as
what we model is a situation where the central bank buys and sells illiquid assets/capital in exchange for reserves.
In Figure 6 we can see how a negative collateral shock propagates in the presence of each type of OMO when the short-term nominal interest rate is constrained. It appears that the type of asset exchanged has very little impact on the path taken by key variables or the mechanism through which the policy works. This poses no deep problem in itself as one of the core motivations for making these adaptations to the model is to ensure the policy we model can be related as closely to the practical conduct of real world policies. However during our welfare analysis in the following section we see that there are di¤erences between the implications of di¤ering styles of OMOs. This suggests a channel by which OMOs, such as those carried out by central banks post crisis, can be an e¤ective and practical means by which to stabilise the economy, even in the absence of an active interest rate policy.
The Role of Policymakers
Having demonstrated a clear role for reserves in this model, the next question is one of how to control this policy tool. If the central bank chooses to supply reserves perfectly elastically to meet the demand of the banking sector then banks will set that demand at the level which is optimal for them in terms of pro…ts. This can be thought of as a …nancially optimal path for reserves. This may not, however, be consistent with the macroeconomic optimum desirable to policymakers. To test this we compare the model where reserves are determined by the banking sector's demand to one where the central bank determines reserve levels in response to a simple policy rule dependent on in ‡ation. Figure 7 shows that in response to a negative collateral shock, even an incredibly simple policy rule can outperform banks setting the level of reserves in terms of stabilisation of key macroeconomic variables. This is because the central bank is at …rst more aggressive, forcing the …nancial intermediaries to take on more reserves than would be pro…t maximising for them and this provides a greater attenuation of the EFP via the same mechanisms an increase in reserves works through when chosen by banks. This brings the economy back to equilibrium quicker and the level of reserves returns quicker to its steady state.
The key point to be taken from Figure 7 is that the …nancially optimum path for reserves and the macro-optimal path are not always the same suggesting an important role for policymakers in monitoring and setting the reserve levels of …nancial institutions, who have an incentive to try and keep reserve levels away from the macro optimal level.
This result holds true when we constrain the policy rate and also when we vary which of the exogenous shocks we put through the system with one exception: a productivity shock. Figure 8 shows that if our contraction is caused by an exogenous fall in productivity in the manufacturing sector then our policy rule causes a deeper and more prolonged fall in real consumption/output. This is due to the fact that under a productivity shock in ‡ation and output move in opposite directions causing a con ‡ict of objectives for the central bank. As the central bank follows its policy rule and cuts reserves to curb the higher in ‡ation, this simultaneously induces a fall in consumption, worsening the contraction already experienced.
The Implications of Balance Sheet Composition
So far we have considered policies which can be loosely termed as quantitative easing, where the level of reserves, and thus the size of the central bank's balance sheet is allowed to ‡uctuate. However, in practise many central banks carried out at least a degree of credit easing (CE) alongside their quantitative easing programmes, especially the U.S. CE di¤ers from QE in that the overall level of reserves doesn't need to change, but the central bank changes the mix of assets on its balance sheet, buying less liquid assets up and selling o¤ more liquid ones to increase liquidity to the private sector. Eggerston and Woodford (2003), among others suggest this should have no impact on the wider economy as there is no motive for it to change agents'long term expectations of monetary policy.
In the context of our model in which reserves are determined by commercial banks'demand we can outline a very basic credit easing policy by simulating a swap, exogenously increasing the level of liquid bonds held by the private sector and simultaneously reducing the level of less liquid capital. When we run this credit easing swap (Figure 9 ), what we …nd is that the marginal value of collateralised lending decreases as there are more liquid assets available to be put up as collateral by the private sector, increasing the e¢ ciency of loan production. This causes consumption to rise and the level of monitoring e¤ort needed by banks to fall, both of which decrease the EFP. The liquidity premium drops as consumption rises and the marginal value of collateralised lending falls, whilst the central bank raises the policy rate in response to the increase in in ‡ation and output. The improved economic conditions subsequently lead to an increase in reserves, but this is less than the increase in lending. This result implies that if credit easing was employed countercyclically then it would be a useful tool in limiting rises in the EFP and liquidity premium, such as those much of the world has experienced recently, even when the policy rate is constrained by increasing the quantity of more liquid assets available to be used by banks as collateral for loans thus increasing their loan production e¢ ciency.
7 Welfare analysis Table 6a shows the asymptotic standard deviation and the contemporaneous cross-correlation with consumption from a simulation of the model allowing us to compare a …xed reserve-deposit ratio regime with one in which reserves are determined by commercial banks and one in which they are set by a central bank policy rule. We also show the results for each type of reserve setting policy with the policy rate constrained so as to highlight the e¢ cacy of policies should the policymaker …nd themselves unable to use interest rate policy.
What we …nd is that endogenising reserves can dramatically lower the standard deviation of in ‡ation, asset prices and the policy rate but with a cost of increased standard deviation in output and monitoring work. There is also an increased deviation in the external …nance and liquidity premia. Perhaps counterintuitively the standard deviation of reserves falls. This is caused by the fact that under a '…xed' regime reserves have to constantly move in order to maintain a constant reserve deposit ratio, whilst in an endogenous reserve setting scenario this is smoothed. By introducing a reserve policy rule we manage to reduce the standard deviation in in ‡ation and asset prices even further but manage to negate some of the trade-o¤ with monitoring work, the EFP and liquidity premium and especially consumption which has a lower standard deviation under a reserves rule than under …xed reserve-deposits. It is worth noting that when the nominal interest rate is constrained, there is an increase in the standard deviation of output, in ‡ation asset prices and other variables, but in an almost equal amount between the two policy rules. Table 6b shows the same information for models in which open market operations are present, responding to endogenous, bank-determined reserve levels. We see here that conducting OMOs by swapping reserves for bonds results in much lower standard deviations, in all but one variable, than conducting them through swaps for capital, even when the interest rate is constrained. The standard deviation of private sector bond holdings logically increases since bonds are now part of an active policy tool. Figure 10 shows the middle segment, as an illustration, from a simulation of 10,000 data points, discarding the …rst 500 observations, of key macroeconomic variables under each policy regime. The simulated data are HP …ltered ( = 1600). Plotting the reserve-deposit ratio we see that endogenising reserves causes the reserve-deposit ratio to ‡uctuate as it responds to commercial bank demand. These ‡uctuations can be smoothed, and a degree of volatility removed by the central bank taking control of reserve policy with an active reserves rule.
Approximating the welfare function
The welfare approximation derived from the canonical New Keynesian model …nds that welfare of the representative household only depends on the variance of output and in ‡ation (Galí (2008) ). We wish to investigate whether this result continues to hold when applied to our richer class of model. The use of the approximation allows us to quantify precisely the welfare rankings arising from each of our policy rules, possibly allowing some normative statements. Thus, we derive a quadratic loss function using a second-order Taylor approximation to utility by using the labour demand function, marginal cost function and sales-production constraint to substitute for household consumption. 19 Once re-ordered and simpli…ed we are left with a loss function with relevant terms in the variances of consumption, in ‡ation, wages, employment in the goods sector and the marginal cost. 20 Having obtained the welfare approximations we can calculate the loss under each policy rule at the benchmark calibration and then rank them using the metric laid out by Gilchrist and Saito (2006) , de…ned as the ratio between the loss obtained from implementing a given policy rule x versus a benchmark policy rule and the loss obtained under the most stabilising policy rule versus the same benchmark.
If this relative gain criteria is less (more) than one then the given policy can be said to be worse (better) than the most stabilising policy. If it is negative than the given policy actually performs worse than the benchmark. This metric allows us to explicitly rank our policies. For our calculations we chose an active interest rate policy rule under a …xed reserves system as our benchmark and our most stabilising reference policy is an active interest rate policy alongside a central bank reserve rule responding to in ‡ation. Table 7 con…rms that, whilst all endogenous reserve policies outperform a …xed reserve system our best welfare outcome is reached by allowing the central bank to control both the 1 9 The additive nature of our household's utility function allows us to take a Taylor expansion of each term and substitute it back into the original function. The labour demand function is then rearranged for monitoring work, a second order expansion taken and substitution made. This process is then repeated for the marginal cost equation. Following Galí (2008) we substitute the resulting linear term in goods sector employment for a second order term in in ‡ation using the sales equal net production constraint. 2 0 The welfare approximation is derived in Section F of the the Technical Appendix. policy rate and the reserve level in response to macroeconomic factors. Within this framework OMOs conducted by swapping reserves for bonds have better welfare implications than OMOs carried out via a swap for capital, but only marginally outperform our benchmark endogenous reserves model. An interesting aspect of this analysis is that we can see the relative loss in welfare caused by the shortterm nominal interest rate becoming constrained (CIR) by comparing an endogenous reserves system with interest rate policy and one of just endogenous reserves. The size of the loss suggests that when confronted with the ZLB, policymakers operating an active reserve strategy may be able to have only limited welfare losses despite not being able to make use of their major policy tool.
The supply of liquidity through the issuance of reserves alongside an active interest rate would appear to reduce the welfare losses faced by the representative household over the business cycle. Reserves attenuate the ‡uctuations in the external …nance premium in response to demand (consumption) and supply (loans) responses to shocks. A banking sector with a liquidity preference is better o¤ when liquidity is supplied over the business cycle and because the requirement for loans from the private sector can in part be met by increasing reserves rather than increasing costly monitoring. Reserves as a monetary-…scal instrument allow the banks to hedge liquidity risk and also improve macroeconomic outcomes so there is not necessarily a trade-o¤ between …nancial and monetary stability. Table 8 shows the asymptotic standard deviation and contemporaneous cross-correlation with real consumption (output) of the reserve-deposit ratio and nominal spending under each policy regime.
Balance Sheet Policy and the Business Cycle
What we see is that as with consumption, in ‡ation and asset prices, we can lower the standard deviation on nominal spending by endogenising our reserve decision, and still further if we allow reserves to be set by a policy rule. The …xed nature of the reserve-deposit ratio in the …rst regime means that by design we have zero standard deviation, but as we allow it to ‡uctuate and take on an active role as a policy tool, our reserves rule, which gives the best welfare option actually has the lowest standard deviation.
To contextualize these movements in terms of the business cycle we can analyse how the movements of these variables are correlated with real GDP, or in the case of our model, consumption. Endogenizing the reserves decision creates a deal of procyclicality in the reserve-deposit ratio suggesting in a boom period commercial banks build up their stock of reserves relative to loans and then run these down in an economic downturn. This is a key part of the mechanism by which the …nancial attenuator works as a systematic policy tool. Under a reserve rule this procyclicality is mostly removed as reserves react to in ‡ation, not output. Nominal spending also becomes more procyclical as we endogenize reserves as we dampen ‡uctuations in the price level, bringing real consumption and nominal spending much closer together.
8 Conclusions converse is also true. We then …nd that varying the central bank balance sheet attenuates the excessive volatility in the external …nance premium that would otherwise ensue. We also solve for commercial banks' optimal levels of illiquid (loans) and liquid asset (reserves) holdings and for the government's budget position by allowing two forms of debt liabilities to be issued: one-period debt to …nance any excess in government expenditures over tax receipts and debt to …nance the issuance of reserves. We are then able to consider the implication of both one-o¤ balance sheet operations and also systematic adoption of balance sheet policies.
We …nd that balance sheet policies can also contribute to the stabilisation of the economy when the interest rate rule is constrained. Our impulse responses show that policies that expand the central bank balance sheet can be shown to stabilise the economy. Rules that swap reserves for assets perform well compared to a straight injection of reserves. We also examine the welfare implications of balance sheet policies and …nd that when reserves are set countercyclically -i.e. they expand when the economy contracts -then the welfare of the representative household is in general burnished compared to an active interest rate rule alone. This is because by setting both the quantity and price of central bank money, the central bank can amplify the control of a monetary economy. Rather than just setting interest rates and letting money supply be supplied elastically on demand, some extra incentives are placed on …nancial activity to that act to prevent the exacerbation of the cycle (Walsh, 2009 ). Encouraging the central bank to alter the size of its balance sheet will not only increase the e¢ cacy of standard interest rate policy but also help prevent the excesses of …nancial intermediation. But ultimately these operations are …scal and require the debt authority to accept the responsibility in hedging liquidity shortages or gluts in the …nancial sector. Model with a …xed reserve-deposit ratio and an unconstrained interest rate policy. 2 4 Model with an endogenous reserve-deposit ratio set by demand from pro…t maximising banks with an unconstrained interest rate policy. 2 5 Model with an endogenous reserve-deposit ratio set by demand from pro…t maximising banks with a constrained interest rate policy 2 6 Model with endogenous reserves set by the central bank according to a reserves policy rule alongside unconstrained interest rate policy. 2 7 Model with endogenous reserves set by the central bank according to a reserves policy rule with constrained interest rate policy. 2 8 St.Dv denotes the asymptotic standard deviation of the relevant variable derived from the …ltered second moments of the solution obtained from the given model. 2 9 Corr denotes the contemporaneous cross-correlation with consumption derived from the …ltered autocovariance of the solution obtained from the given model. Model in which OMOs involve an exchange of reserves for bonds to meet endogenous reserve demand of banks alongside unconstrained interest rate policy. 3 1 Model in which OMOs involve an exchange of reserves for bonds to meet endogenous reserve demand of banks with constrained interest rate policy. 3 2 Model in which OMOs involve an exchange of reserves for capital to meet endogenous reserve demand of banks alongside unconstrained interest rate policy. 3 3 Model in which OMOs involve an exchange of reserves for capital to meet endogenous reserve demand of banks with constrained interest rate policy. Figure 10 shows the middle segment of a simulation of 10,000 data points based on each model of reserve setting. The simulated data are HP …ltered ( = 1600)
